Philosophical Studies 162 (2):183-200 (2013)
This article attempts to do two things. The first is to make it plausible that any adequate dispositional view of color will have to associate colors with complex functions from a wide range of normal circumstances to a wide range of (simultaneously) incompatible color appearances, so that there will be no uniquely veridical appearance of any given color. The second is to show that once this move is made, dispositionalism is in a position to provide interesting answers to some of the most challenging objections that have been pressed against it. It explains why colors do not seem to come on when the lights come on, and why the right thing to say seems to be that the light causes the objects to reveal their colors. It explains why the content of visual experience need not be problematically circular. It eliminates the problem of intrapersonal variation in color appearance. And it even provides resources for dealing with the problem of interpersonal variation. It is true that in moving to the more complex view, the dispositionalist becomes subject to a new objection, which has been called the problem of unity. The paper offers a solution to this problem as well.
|Keywords||Color Dispositionalism Response-dependence Circularity Perception Appearance Aspects|
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References found in this work BETA
Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Color as a Secondary Quality.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1989 - Mind 98 (January):81-103.
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