Analysis 69 (4):714-721 (
2009)
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Abstract
1. IntroductionThe Emotional Construction of Morals is a tour de force that combines empirical data and philosophical argument in an impressively coherent way. Certainly it resists any sweeping assessment; a mere presentation of the principal lines of argument would itself take the space of an article. Also, and despite its systematic structure, I do not think Prinz's view places decisive weight on any small number of points. Consequently, I do not think it can be refuted in any wholesale way. Nevertheless, I often find myself in very sharp disagreement with Prinz. What I would like to do in this article, therefore, is to focus on what seem to be some broad issues of perspective, and see if I can convince readers that taking a slightly different perspective on certain matters might undermine the apparent force of much of what he has to say. In particular, I will focus on the analogy between moral properties and colour properties: an analogy to which Prinz himself appeals. As a corollary I will also try to show that Prinz's focus, for many purposes, on cannibalism and issues of sexual morality undermines the relevance of much of the empirical data he brings to bear in defending his sentimentalist moral theory.According to Prinz, moral judgements are manifestations of complex emotional dispositions that he calls ‘sentiments’. But unlike the expressivist, who might easily embrace the spirit of this claim, Prinz also holds that the existence of these sentiments is sufficient to generate moral properties and facts; moral properties are simply powers to activate our moral sentiments, and it is often a fact that an action has such a property. In holding moral properties to be powers of this sort, Prinz embraces both an analogy with colours, and a certain understanding of what colours are: secondary qualities understood …