Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):823-824 (2005)

The Ultimatum Game is commonly interpreted as a two-person bargaining game. The third person who donates and may withdraw the money is not included in the theoretical equations, but treated like a neutral measurement instrument. Yet in a cross-cultural analysis it seems necessary to consider the possibility that the thoughts of a player – strategic, altruistic, selfish, or concerned about reputation – are influenced by both an anonymous second player and the non-anonymous experimenter.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x05300148
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