Mad scientists or unreliable autobiographers? dopamine dysregulation and delusion

In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti, Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press (2009)
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Philip Gerrans
University of Adelaide

Citations of this work

Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia.Lisa Bortolotti - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3):879-900.
Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Does reflection lead to wise choices?Lisa Bortolotti - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):297-313.

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