In Brie Gertler & Lawrence Shapiro (eds.), Arguing About the Mind. Routledge. pp. 192--206 (2007)
Clark and Chalmers argue that the mind is extended – that is, its boundary lies beyond the skin. In this essay, I will criticize this conclusion. However, I will also defend some of the more controversial elements of Clark and Chalmers's argument. I reject their conclusion because I think that their argument shows that a seemingly innocuous assumption, about internal states and processes, is flawed. My goal is not to conclusively refute Clark and Chalmers's conclusion. My aim is only to reveal the best alternative for those who remain skeptical about the existence – or, perhaps, even the possibility – of extended minds
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