Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge

(ed.)
Ashgate (2003)
Authors
Brie Gertler
University of Virginia
Abstract
When read as demands for justification, these questions seem absurd. We don’t normally ask people to substantiate assertions like “I think it will rain tomorrow” or “I have a headache”. There is, at the very least, a strong presumption that sincere self-attributions about one’s thoughts and feelings are true. In fact, some philosophers believe that such self-attributions are less susceptible to doubt than any other claims. Even those who reject that extreme view generally acknowledge that there is some salient epistemic difference between (a) one’s belief that she thinks it will rain tomorrow, or that she has a headache, and (b) her belief that it is raining, or that another person has a headache.
Keywords Privileged Access  Self-knowledge  Ryle, G
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ISBN(s) 0754616479   9780754616474
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Factive Phenomenal Characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
La Pensée Sans Sujet Pensant.Paul Bernier - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (4):589-602.

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