Salient Alternatives in Perspective

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):792-810 (2020)
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Abstract

This paper empirically investigates how perspective bears on putative salient alternative effects on knowledge ascriptions. Some theoretical accounts predict salient alternative effects in both fir...

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Author Profiles

Mikkel Gerken
University of Southern Denmark
Chad Gonnerman
University of Southern Indiana
Joshua Alexander
Siena College
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Citations of this work

Much at stake in knowledge.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (5):729-749.
Knowledge and loose talk.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. London: Routledge. pp. 272-297.

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