Stochastic Evolution of Rules for Playing Finite Normal Form Games

Theory and Decision 62 (4):311-333 (2007)

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the “folk results” of evolutionary game theory, typically obtained with a fixed game and fixed strategies, carry over to the present environments. The results are also related to some recent experiments on rules and games
Keywords bounded rationality  evolutionary dynamics  learning  normal form games  rules  stochastic dynamics
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DOI 10.1007/s11238-007-9032-8
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On an Evolutionary Foundation of Neuroeconomics.Burkhard C. Schipper - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):495-513.

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