Abstract

The aim of this study is fourfold. The first task is to supply the reader with an overview of the process whereby "nature" has come to be regarded in terms of quantifiable generic mass--that is, as disenchanted. It is argued here that Descartes' formulation of "practical philosophy" is a decisive turning point in this development within Western thought. What follows is a examination of certain thinkers who contend with the epistemological consequences of disenchantment. Included are individuals such as Kant, Dilthey, Rickert, and Nietzsche--all of whom figure prominently in the intellectual matrix that comprises the foundation of Weber's "disenchantment thesis". ;The second objective is to present a full description of the disenchantment thesis, both in its initial Weberian formulation and in its subsequent reinterpretations. Contributors to the elaboration of the disenchantment thesis include Lukacs, Ellul, Horkheimer, and Adorno. ;The third substantive aim of this study is to present the reader with two arguments which, contrary to those of Weber and his previously mentioned commentators, attempt to vindicate the modern project by upholding nature as disenchanted and reason as instrumental. The most cogent defense of this sort is put forth by Habermas. ;The final objective is to show that Habermas' attempt to supplement technical reason with an alternate and nonconfrontational mode of reasoning is unsatisfactory and that the issue of disenchantment can be addressed adequately only if we reassess our understanding of reason at its core. It is argued here that such a reassessment necessarily is dependent upon the development of a "non-egological" perspective on the relationship between man and his natural environment. This investigation concludes by arguing that Merleau-Ponty's "philosophy of the flesh" offers us one such perspective and therefore merits our serious consideration. The political implications of the abandonment of the egological paradigm rounds off the investigation