The Surprise Examination in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Synthese 155 (1):21-33 (2007)
Abstract
We examine the paradox of the surprise examination using dynamic epistemic logic. This logic contains means of expressing epistemic facts as well as the effects of learning new facts, and is therefore a natural framework for representing the puzzle. We discuss a number of different interpretations of the puzzle in this context, and show how the failure of principle of success, that states that sentences, when learned, remain to be true and come to be believed, plays a central role in understanding the puzzle.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-005-2211-7
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References found in this work BETA

Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
Defaults in Update Semantics.Frank Veltman - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):221 - 261.

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Citations of this work BETA

Arrow Update Logic.Barteld Kooi & Bryan Renne - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):536-559.
The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox.Ken Levy - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.
On Being in an Undiscoverable Position.Wesley H. Holliday - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):33-40.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Hans van Ditmarsch, Wiebe van der Hoek & Barteld Kooi - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic Logic and Epistemology.Wesley H. Holliday - forthcoming - In Sven Ove Hansson Vincent F. Hendricks (ed.), Handbook of Formal Philosophy. Springer.
Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Barteld P. Kooi - 2003 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (4):381-408.
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On Being in an Undiscoverable Position.Wesley H. Holliday - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):33-40.

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