Synthese 178 (3):529-547 (2011)
I develop an approach to action and practical deliberation according to which the degree of epistemic warrant required for practical rationality varies with practical context. In some contexts of practical deliberation, very strong warrant is called for. In others, less will do. I set forth a warrant account, (WA), that captures this idea. I develop and defend (WA) by arguing that it is more promising than a competing knowledge account of action due to John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley. I argue that cases of warranted false belief speak in favor of (WA) and against the knowledge account. Moreover, I note some problems with an “excuse maneuver” that proponents of the knowledge account frequently invoke in response to cases of warranted false belief. Finally, I argue that (WA) may provide a strict invariantist account of cases that have been thought to motivate interest-relative or subject-sensitive theories of knowledge and warrant.
|Keywords||Epistemology Practical rationality Action Knowledge Invariantism Practical reasoning Epistemic warrant|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Citations of this work BETA
Same, Same but Different: The Epistemic Norms of Assertion, Action and Practical Reasoning.Mikkel Gerken - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):725-744.
Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Mikkel Gerken - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):532-557.
Knowledge Norms and Acting Well.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-55.
The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):141-161.
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