We can't know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know a priori that water does?

Analysis 64 (1):44-47 (2004)
Abstract
Goldberg (2003) defends externalism from Boghossian's (1998) version of the "armchair knowledge" objection. I argue here that, while Goldberg's challenge blocks a different version of this objection, it does not directly block Boghossian's version. And Goldberg's approach is not promising as a response to Boghossian's version of the armchair knowledge objection.
Keywords Concept  Epistemology  Externalism  Natural Kinds  Privileged Access  Boghossian, P  Goldberg, S
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DOI 10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00459.x
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