Are moral philosophers moral experts?

Bioethics 24 (4):153-159 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I examine the question of whether ethicists are moral experts. I call people moral experts if their moral judgments are correct with high probability and for the right reasons. I defend three theses, while developing a version of the coherence theory of moral justification based on the differences between moral and nonmoral experience: The answer to the question of whether there are moral experts depends on the answer to the question of how to justify moral judgments. Deductivism and the coherence theory both provide some support for the opinion that moral experts exist in some way. I maintain – within the framework of a certain kind of coherence theory – that moral philosophers are 'semi-experts'.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,252

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
229 (#84,338)

6 months
13 (#169,369)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Attentional Moral Perception.Jonna Vance & Preston J. Werner - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (5):501-525.
Taxonomizing Views of Clinical Ethics Expertise.Erica K. Salter & Abram Brummett - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics 19 (11):50-61.
Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence.Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.
Epistemic democracy and the role of experts.Cathrine Holst & Anders Molander - 2019 - Contemporary Political Theory 18 (4):541-561.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references