Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

Analysis 23 (6):121-123 (1963)
Abstract
Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/23.6.121
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