Manuscrito 34 (1):207-232 (2011)

Michel Ghins
Université Catholique de Louvain
This paper is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of Bas van Fraassen’s views on representation. While I agree with most of his claims, I disagree on the following three issues. Firstly, I contend that some isomorphism between the representor and what is represented is a universal necessary condition for the success of any representation, even in the case of misrepresentation. Secondly, I argue that the so-called “semantic” or “model-theoretic” construal of theories does not give proper due to the role played by true propositions in successful representing practices. Thirdly, I attempt to show that the force of van Fraassen’s pragmatic - and antirealist - “dissolution” of the “loss of reality objection” loses its bite when we realize that our cognitive contact with real phenomena is achieved not by representing but by expressing true propositions about them
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DOI 10.1590/S0100-60452011000100010
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References found in this work BETA

The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
The Scientific Image.Michael Friedman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):274-283.

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