Norman and truetemp revisited reliabilistically: A proper functionalist defeat account of clairvoyance

Episteme 13 (1):89-110 (2015)
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Abstract

The cases of Norman the Clairvoyant and Mr. Truetemp form classic counterexamples to the process reliabilist's claim that reliability is sufficient for prima facie justification. I discuss several ways in which contemporary reliabilists have tried to deal with these counterexamples, and argue that they are all unsuccessful. Instead, I propose that the most promising route lies with an appeal to a specific kind of higher-order defeat that is best cashed out in terms of properly functioning monitoring mechanisms

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Harmen Ghijsen
Radboud University

References found in this work

Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
Introspection.Alex Byrne - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.
Process reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.

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