Authors
Michel Ghins
Université Catholique de Louvain
Abstract
After a brief presentation of what I take to be the representational démarche in science, I stress the fundamental role of true judgements in model construction. The success and correctness of a representation rests on the truth of judgements which attribute properties to real targeted entities, called “ontic judgements”. I then present what van Fraassen calls “the Loss of Reality objection”. After criticizing his dissolution of the objection, I offer an alternative way of answering the Loss of Reality objection by showing that the contact of our models with reality is grounded on the truth of ontic judgements. I conclude by examining. doi: 10.5007 / 1808-1711.2011v15n3p461
Keywords Representation  judgements.  model  modelo  realism  realismo  van Fraassen  Representação  juízos
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Reprint years 2012
DOI 10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n3p461
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References found in this work BETA

How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
The Scientific Image.Michael Friedman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):274-283.
The Empirical Stance.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2002 - Yale University Press.

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