What a self could be (commentary on metzinger)

Psyche 11 (5) (2005)
Abstract
Metzinger’s claim that there are no such things as selves has given rise to a lot of discussions. By examining the notion of self used by Metzinger, I want to clarify what he means when saying that nobody ever was or had a self. Furthermore, I want to examine if there could be a notion of ‘self’ which is compatible with the Self- Model Theory of Subjectivity (SMT). I will argue that there is a notion of self which is not only compatible with the SMT, but that the SMT also provides the theoretical framework for developing such a notion
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