Domain restriction and the arguments of quantificational determiners

Classical generalized quantifier (GQ) theory posits that quantificational determiners (Q-dets) combine with a nominal argument of type et, a first order predicate, to form a GQ. In a recent paper, Matthewson (2001) challenges this position by arguing that the domain of a Q-det is not of type et, but e, an entity. In this paper, I defend the classical GQ view, and argue that the data that motivated Matthewson’s revision actually suggest that the domain set can, and indeed in certain languages must, be contextually restricted overtly.
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References found in this work BETA

On Quantifier Domain Restriction.Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (2-3):219--61.
Restrictions on Quantifier Domains.Kai von Fintel - 1994 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Reference to Kinds Across Language.Gennaro Chierchia - 1998 - Natural Language Semantics 6 (4):339-405.
Nominal Restriction.Jason Stanley - 2002 - In Georg Peter & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 365--390.

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Citations of this work BETA

Modal Indefinites.Luis Alonso-Ovalle & Paula Menéndez-Benito - 2010 - Natural Language Semantics 18 (1):1-31.
Semantic with Assignment Variables.Alex Silk - forthcoming - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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