Theoria 86 (2):245-267 (2020)

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Abstract
Theoria, EarlyView.
Keywords Brewer  Siegel  content view  perceptual constancy  perceptual content
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12234
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Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):490-494.
The Silence of the Senses.Charles S. Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Perception and its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):87-97.

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