The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information

Economics and Philosophy 7 (1):37-65 (1991)
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Abstract

For the past 20 years or so the literature on noncooperative games has been centered on the search for an equilibrium concept that expresses the notion of rational behavior in interactive situations. A basic tenet in this literature is that if a “rational solution” exists, it must be a Nash equilibrium. The consensus view, however, is that not all Nash equilibria can be accepted as rational solutions. Consider, for example, the game of Figure 1

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Giacomo Bonanno
University of California, Davis

References found in this work

Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Modeling Rational Players: Part I.Ken Binmore - 1987 - Economics and Philosophy 3 (2):179-214.
Sequential Equilibria.David Kreps - 1982 - Econometrica 50:863-894.

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