The Way Things Look: a Defence of Content


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Abstract
How does perceptual experience disclose the world to our view? In the first introductory section, I set up a contrast between the representational and the purely relational conception of perceptual experience. In the second section, I discuss an argument given by Charles Travis against perceptual content. The third section is devoted to the phenomenon of perceptual constancy: in 3.1 I describe the phenomenon. In 3.2 I argue that the description given suggests a phenomenological distinction that can be deployed for a defence of content. In 3.3 I compare and contrast my view of perceptual content with that of Susanna Schellenberg : 55–84, 2008). Finally, I support my conception of content by means of an argument that links content to the way in which the mind-independent nature of material objects is manifest in perceptual experience.
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-018-0393-4
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References found in this work BETA

Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
The Silence of the Senses.Charles S. Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Intentionality.John R. Searle - 1984 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.
Experience and Content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.

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