Mind 115 (457):19-39 (2006)

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Abstract
This paper argues for externalism about justification on the basis of thought experiments. I present cases in which two individuals are intrinsically and introspectively indistinguishable and in which intuitively, one is justified in believing that p while the other is not. I also examine an argument for internalism based on the ideas that we have privileged access to whether or not our own beliefs are justified and that only internalism is compatible with this privilege. I isolate what I take to be the most plausible form of privileged access to justification and show that it is compatible with externalism.
Keywords Epistemology  Internalism/Externalism  Epistemic Responsibility
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzl019
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References found in this work BETA

Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.
Should Have Known.Sanford Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.

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