Externalism and knowledge of the attitudes

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):13-28 (2001)
Abstract
Knowledge of your own propositional attitudes requires at least two things. You need to know the content of the relevant mental state, and you need to know what attitude you take towards that content. If it is possible to mistake a wish for a belief, this is a mistake about the attitude, not the content. One need not believe that we are generally infallible about our mental states to hold that, typically, when I sincerely say..
Keywords Attitude  Content  Context  Epistemology  Externalism  Knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00211
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.
The Psychology of Folk Psychology.A. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
Content and Self-Knowledge.Paul Boghossian - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.

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Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Content.Asa Maria Wikforss - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):399-424.

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