Is the partial identity account of property resemblance logically incoherent?

Dialectica 61 (4):539-558 (2007)
Abstract
According to the partial identity account of resemblance, exact resemblance is complete identity and inexact resemblance is partial identity. In this paper, I examine Arda Denkel's (1998) argument that this account of resemblance is logically incoherent as it results in a vicious regress. I claim that although Denkel's argument does not succeed, a modified version of it leads to the conclusion that the partial identity account is plausible only if the constituents of every determinate property are ultimately quantitative in nature.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01121.x
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References found in this work BETA
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
Universals and Scientific Realism.D. M. Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sellarsian Particulars.Matteo Morganti - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (3):293-306.
Nomological Resemblance.Robin Stenwall - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):31-46.

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