Relational Contractualism and Future Persons

Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2):135-160 (2016)

Authors
Michael Gibb
Oxford University
Abstract
_ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 2, pp 135 - 160 A moral theory should tell us something about our obligations to future persons. It is therefore sometimes objected that contractualist moral theories cannot give a satisfactory account of such obligations, as there is little to motivate a contract with persons who can offer us almost nothing in return. I will argue that more recent “relational” forms of contractualism escape these objections. These forms of contractualism do, however, remain vulnerable to Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem. Recent attempts to resolve this problem have looked to the role “generic reasons” and “standpoints” play in contractualist theories. I argue that these views provide an important line of response in cases where the deliberating agent has limited information about the identities of those their actions will affect, but that the non-identity problem is not such a case. I conclude by considering some remaining options for the relational contractualist
Keywords future persons   non-identity problems   relational moral theories   contractualism
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DOI 10.1163/17455243-4681057
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas M. Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
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Who Can Be Wronged?Rahul Kumar - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2):99-118.
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Citations of this work BETA

Contractualism, Person-Affecting Wrongness and the Non-Identity Problem.Corey Katz - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):103-119.

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