Seeing What You're Doing

In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press (2010)

We have some kind of privileged access to our own intentional actions. At least typically, if we're doing it on purpose, we know what we're doing. This privilege consists in the fact that the facts in virtue of which you're intentionally acting are not independent of the facts in virtue of which you're in a position to know what you're doing. An explanation of this privilege is an explanation of the relevant sort of nonindependence. In this paper, I try to explain privileged access to action on the basis of the following idea. Ordinary intentional action requires a great deal of ordinary empirical knowledge, and this knowledge is usually sufficient to let you know what you're doing. Since both action and knowledge of action depend on the same empirical knowledge, we have the kind of nonindependence that explains privilege.
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Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.
Perception and Practical Knowledge.John Schwenkler - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152.
Agency and Observation in Knowledge of One's Own Thinking.Casey Doyle - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):148-161.

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