What's Morally Special about Free Exchange?

Abstract
Is there anything morally special about free exchange? In asking this, I am asking not only about extreme, so-called “libertarian” views, on which free exchange is sacrosanct, but about more widespread, moderate views, on which there is at least something morally special about free exchange. On these more compromising views, other moral considerations may override the moral importance of free exchange, but even when rights of free exchange are restricted for good reason, something morally important is lost. For some, free exchange may preserve liberty, in some morally significant sense, or realize some such moral value as “to each his own.” Alternatively, a system of free exchange may have a special moral status by virtue of the kinds of pragmatic arguments that economists give, arguments that free exchange produces good social results. Whether free exchange has any such virtues as these is the broad question I address in this paper. I offer what I have to say somewhat in the spirit of an overview. Philosophical scrutiny and economic analysis combine, it seems to me, to delineate fairly clearly what is, and what is not, morally special about free exchange
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0265052500003198
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 25,136
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.
Free Speech, Free Exchange, and Rawlsian Liberalism.Daniel Shapiro - 1991 - Social Theory and Practice 17 (1):47-68.
Reply to O'Connor.Steven S. Aspenson - 1989 - Faith and Philosophy 6 (1):95-98.
Is the Current Practice of Psychotherapy Morally Permissible?Jason A. Beyer - 2001 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (1):85-105.
A Fiduciary Argument Against Stakeholder Theory.Alexei M. Marcoux - 2003 - Business Ethics Quarterly 13 (1):1-24.
Free Will and Respect for Persons.Saul Smilansky - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):248-261.
Non-Moral Evil and the Free Will Defense.Kenneth Boyce - 2011 - Faith and Philosophy 28 (4):371-384.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-08-31

Total downloads

41 ( #119,838 of 2,132,968 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #236,925 of 2,132,968 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums