Philosophical Studies 144 (2):297 - 311 (2009)

Authors
Daniel Giberman
University of Texas at Arlington
Abstract
Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.
Keywords Quasi-memory  Psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity  Diachronic personal identity  Personal identity
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9211-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,232
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Persons and Their Pasts.Sydney Shoemaker - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):269-85.
Memory and Persons.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):289-337.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Word of Others.Steffen Borge - 2003 - Journal of Applied Logic 1 (1-2):107-118.
Careers and Quareers: A Reply to Burge.Sydney Shoemaker - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):87-102.
Memory, Quasi-Memory, and Pseudo-Quasi-Memory.Christopher Buford - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):465 – 478.
Memory and Persons.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):289-337.
Memory, Anaphora, and Content Preservation.Krista Lawlor - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (2):97-119.
Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism.John McDowell - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):243-255.
Replies From Tyler Burge.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press.
Memory and Identity.Marya Schechtman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):65-79.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
415 ( #14,922 of 2,329,886 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #151,284 of 2,329,886 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes