Philosophical Studies 144 (2):297 - 311 (2009)
Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.
|Keywords||Quasi-memory Psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity Diachronic personal identity Personal identity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Personal Identity and the Concept of a Person.John Perry - 1983 - In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Replies From Tyler Burge.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press.
Burge on Mentalistic Explanations, or Why I Am Still Epiphobic.Fred Dretske - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.
Personal Identity, Multiple Personality Disorder, and Moral Personhood.Steve Matthews - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):67-88.
Memory, Anaphora, and Content Preservation.Krista Lawlor - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (2):97-119.
Memory, Quasi-Memory, and Pseudo-Quasi-Memory.Christopher Buford - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):465 – 478.
Careers and Quareers: A Reply to Burge.Sydney Shoemaker - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):87-102.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads382 ( #6,053 of 2,132,935 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #88,829 of 2,132,935 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.