Forbidding intentional mutilation: Some unintended consequences?

In a recent IPQ article, Christopher Kaczor gave a promising argument in which he strove to reconcile the common belief that obstetric craniotomy (the crushing of nearlyborn fetuses’ heads) is immoral with his clear and intuitively attractive account of intention. One of Kaczor’s crucial assumptions is that intentional mutilation is morally impermissible. In this article I argue that Kaczor’s analysis has three potential problems: (1) the mutilating features of craniotomy do not appear to meet Kaczor’s criteria for being intended, so his account doesn’t show craniotomy to be impermissible; (2) some commonly-accepted acts, including voluntary sterilization, are acts of intentional mutilation according to Kaczor’s definition and are thus forbidden on his account; and (3) some acts that intuitively seem to constitute intentional mutilation do not meet Kaczor’s definition of “mutilation” and are not ruled out by his account. I suggest slight modifications to Kaczor’s account that might address these difficulties
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  History of Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0019-0365
DOI 10.5840/ipq20074747
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,769
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption Bei Brentano.Werner Sauer - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):1-26.
Can Mental Representations Be Triggering Causes?Carrie Figdor - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):43-61.
Faith and Reason and Physician-Assisted Suicide.C. Kaczor - 1998 - Christian Bioethics 4 (2):183-201.
Nature as Reason.Christopher Kaczor - 2006 - International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):121-122.
Distinguishing Intention From Foresight.Christopher Kaczor - 2001 - International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):77-89.
Intention, Foresight, and Mutilation: A Response to Giebel.Christopher Kaczor - 2007 - International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):477-482.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

12 ( #373,198 of 2,158,886 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #353,777 of 2,158,886 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums