Human moral responsibility is moral responsibility enough: A reply to F. Allan Hanson [Book Review]

Hanson claims that moral responsibility should be distributed among both the humans and artifacts comprising complex wholes that produce morally relevant outcomes in the world. I argue that this claim is not sufficiently supported. In particular, adopting a consequentialist understanding of morality does not by itself support the view that the existence of a causally necessary object in such a complex whole is sufficient for assigning moral responsibility to that object. Moreover, there are good reasons, both evolutionary and contemporary, for not adopting this stance.
Keywords Moral responsibility  Extended agency  Distributed cognition
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-008-9095-1
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