Manuscrito 36 (1):190 (2013)

Authors
Gilson Olegario
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
Abstract
Several recent works in history and philosophy of science have re-evaluated the alleged opposition between the theses put forth by logical empiricists such as Carnap and the so-called "post-positivists", such as Kuhn. Although the latter came to be viewed as having seriously challenged the logical positivist views of science, recent authors (e.g., Friedman, Reisch, Earman, Irzik and Grünberg) maintain that some of the most notable theses of the Kuhnian view of science have striking similarities with some aspects of Carnap's philosophy. Against that reading, Oliveira and Psillos argue that within Carnap's philosophy there is no place for the Kuhnian theses of incommensurability, holism, and theory-ladenness of observations. This paper presents each of those readings and argues that Carnap and Kuhn have non-opposing views on holism, incommensurability, the theory-ladenness of observations, and scientific revolutions. We note at the very end - without dwelling on the point, however - that they come apart on other matters, such as their views on metaphysics and on the context of discovery/justification distinction.
Keywords Holism  Scientific revolutions  Incommensurability  Theory-ladenness of observations  Linguistic frameworks  Carnap  Kuhn
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.
Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?George A. Reisch - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (2):264-277.
Was Carnap Entirely Wrong, After All?Howard Stein - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):275-295.
Protokollsätze.Otto Neurath - 1932 - Erkenntnis 3 (1):204-214.

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