Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):109-119 (2001)

Authors
Margaret Gilbert
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in some way reducible to the personal preferences of their members? In short, are collective preferences possible? In everyday life people speak easily of what we prefer, where what is at issue seems to be a collective preference. This is suggested by the acceptability of such remarks as ‘My ideal walk would be . . . along rougher and less well-marked paths than we prefer as a family’. One can imagine, indeed, that each member of a given family prefers something other than what the family prefers. What, then, do the collective preferences of everyday understanding amount to?
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DOI 10.1017/s0266267101000177
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Collectives' Duties and Collectivisation Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231-248.
Group Agency and Supervenience.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.
Two Kinds of We-Reasoning.Raul Hakli, Kaarlo Miller & Raimo Tuomela - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):291-320.
Group Virtue Epistemology.Jesper Kallestrup - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
The Transfer of Duties: From Individuals to States and Back Again.Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2016 - In Michael Brady & Miranda Fricker (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups. Oxford University Press. pp. 150-172.

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