Collective preferences, obligations, and rational choice

Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):109-119 (2001)

Margaret Gilbert
University of California, Irvine
Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in some way reducible to the personal preferences of their members? In short, are collective preferences possible? In everyday life people speak easily of what we prefer, where what is at issue seems to be a collective preference. This is suggested by the acceptability of such remarks as ‘My ideal walk would be . . . along rougher and less well-marked paths than we prefer as a family’. One can imagine, indeed, that each member of a given family prefers something other than what the family prefers. What, then, do the collective preferences of everyday understanding amount to?
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s0266267101000177
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,928
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Collectives' Duties and Collectivisation Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231-248.
Two Kinds of We-Reasoning.Raul Hakli, Kaarlo Miller & Raimo Tuomela - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):291-320.
Group Agency and Supervenience.Philip Pettit - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (Supplement):85-105.
Group Virtue Epistemology.Jesper Kallestrup - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
Legal Hypocrisy.Ekow N. Yankah - 2019 - Ratio Juris 32 (1):2-20.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
130 ( #51,588 of 2,319,058 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #172,673 of 2,319,058 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature