Differentiating insight from non-insight problems

Thinking and Reasoning 11 (3):279 – 302 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This study aimed to investigate whether a range of tasks that have been generally classed as requiring insight form an empirically separable group of tasks distinct from tasks generally classed as non-insight. In this study, 24 insight tasks, 10 non-insight tasks, and tests of individual differences in cognitive abilities and working memory were administered to 60 participants. Cluster analysis of the problem-solving tasks indicated that the presumed insight problems did tend to cluster with other presumed insight problems, and similarly the presumed non-insight problems tended to cluster with other presumed non-insight tasks. Performance on presumed insight problems was particularly linked to measures of ideational flexibility with a different pattern of results for the non-insight tasks. Spatial insight problems were linked to spatial flexibility and verbal insight tasks were linked to vocabulary scores. The results are discussed in relation to recent developments of dual process theories of thinking.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,215

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The nature of insight.Stuart G. Shanker - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (4):561-581.
Insight and the Subject.Eric James Morelli - 2011 - International Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):137-148.
The Puzzle of the Subject as Subject in Lonergan.Frederick E. Crowe - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):187-205.
Insight and strategy in multiple-cue learning.David R. Shanks - 2006 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 135 (2):162-183.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
76 (#160,988)

6 months
1 (#449,220)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.Steven A. Sloman - 1996 - Psychological Bulletin 119 (1):3-22.
The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory?Alan Baddeley - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (11):417-423.
The associative basis of the creative process.Sarnoff Mednick - 1962 - Psychological Review 69 (3):220-232.
Thoughts beyond words: When language overshadows insight.Jonathan W. Schooler, Stellan Ohlsson & Kevin Brooks - 1993 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 122 (2):166.

View all 8 references / Add more references