Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):29-64 (2018)
Authors
Jens Gillessen
University of Marburg
Abstract
Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long-term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The article challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action – or at least for retaining one's intention until the time to act has come? Or is the rationality of ‘doing as you decide’ governed by diachronic wide-scope norms, as Michael Bratman and John Broome suggest? All of these approaches are shown to raise severe problems, which suggests a more modest view: diachronic pressures on intending are at each point in time confined to the very next instant.
Keywords intention  diachronicity  rationality  Bratman, Michael  Ferrero, Luca  Broome, John
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1111/papq.12147
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,762
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.
The Myth of Instrumental Rationality.Joseph Raz - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):28.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Diachronic Constraints of Practical Rationality.Luca Ferrero - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):144-164.
Diachronic Structural Rationality.Luca Ferrero - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):311-336.
Unifying the Requirements of Rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.
There Are Diachronic Norms of Rationality.Ulf Hlobil - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):38-45.
Reasons and Intentions.Bruno Verbeek (ed.) - 2007 - Ashgate.
Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Reply to Ferrero.Kirk Ludwig - 2015 - Methode: Analytic Perspectives 4 (6):75-87.
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlin
Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
Pro-Tempore Disjunctive Intentions.Luca Ferrero - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & MIchael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and The Philosophy of Action. Routledge. pp. 108-123.
On the Principle of Intention Agglomeration.Jing Zhu - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):89 - 99.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-08-28

Total downloads
219 ( #22,068 of 2,263,121 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #63,841 of 2,263,121 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature