Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):79-98 (2001)

Authors
Bradley Rives
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
By quantifying over properties we cannot create new properties any more than by quantifying over individuals we can create new individuals. Someone murdered Jones, and the murderer is either Smith or Jones or Wang. That “someone”, who murdered Jones, is not a person in addition to Smith, Jones, and Wang, and it would be absurd to posit a disjunctive person, Smith-or-Jones-or-Wang, with whom to identify the murderer. The same goes for second-order properties and their realizers. (Kim (1997a), p.201)
Keywords Generalization  Metaphysics  Mind  Realization  World  Kim, J
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI southernjphil20013915
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References found in this work BETA

Causality and Properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel. pp. 109-35.

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Citations of this work BETA

Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough.Barry M. Loewer - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 243--64.

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