Synthese 46 (1):41 - 93 (1981)
A feature of David Lewis's account of conventions in his book "Convention" which has received admiring notices from philosophers is his use of the mathematical theory of games. In this paper I point out a number of serious flaws in Lewis's use of game theory. Lewis's basic claim is that conventions cover 'coordination problems'. I show that game-Theoretical analysis tends to establish that coordination problems in Lewis's sense need not underlie conventions.
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On Collective Intentions: Collective Action in Economics and Philosophy.Nicholas Bardsley - 2007 - Synthese 157 (2):141-159.
Game Theory and the Evolution of Behaviour.J. Maynard Smith - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):95.
Development and the Origin of Behavioral Strategies.Timothy D. Johnston - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):108.
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