Humean Sentimentalism and Non-Consequentialist Moral Thinking

Hume Studies 37 (2):165-188 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Of the many objections moral rationalists have raised against moral sentimentalism, none has been more long-lived and central than the claim that sentimentalism cannot accommodate the non-consequentialist aspects of our moral thinking. John Balguy raised an early version of the non-consequentialist objection just two years after Francis Hutcheson published the first systematic development of moral sentimentalism. As Balguy understood it, Hutcheson's sentimentalism implied that what makes an action virtuous is its effects, such as the advantages or pleasures it produces. According to Balguy, however, what we actually think makes an action virtuous is an intrinsic quality it possesses, which is independent of any ..



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,703

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Reply to Justin D'Arms and Lori Watson.Michael Slote - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):148-155.
Metaethics and emotions research: A response to Prinz.Karen Jones - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53.
Two Arguments for Sentimentalism.Justin D’Arms - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1-21.
History of Ethics.Michael B. Gill - 2004 - Hume Studies 30:149-81.
Herder's Moral Philosophy: Perfectionism, Sentimentalism and Theism.Benjamin D. Crowe - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1141-1161.


Added to PP

83 (#183,025)

6 months
7 (#173,711)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael B. Gill
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references