Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709–717 (2003)
AbstractFoundationalist, Coherentist, Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect--all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating, chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls "Infinitism"--the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of regress. My conclusion will be that until Klein answers these metaphysical worries he will not have restored Infinitism as a viable option in epistemology
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References found in this work
The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):3-26.
Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325.
The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics.John F. Post - 1987 - Cornell University Press.
Citations of this work
Dependence, Justification and Explanation: Must Reality Be Well-Founded?Matteo Morganti - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):555-572.
Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.
Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2009 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2):183-193.