Authors
Carl Gillett
Northern Illinois University
Abstract
Foundationalist, Coherentist, Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect--all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating, chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls "Infinitism"--the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of regress. My conclusion will be that until Klein answers these metaphysical worries he will not have restored Infinitism as a viable option in epistemology
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00285.x
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References found in this work BETA

Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325.
The Cosmological Argument.William L. Rowe - 1971 - Noûs 5 (1):49-61.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.
Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2009 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2):183-193.

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