PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:373 - 380 (1988)
This paper suggests a new principle for confirmation theory which is called the principle of explanatory surplus. This principle is shown to be non-Bayesian in character, and to lead to a treatment of simplicity in science. Two cases of the principle of explanatory surplus are considered. The first (number of parameters) is illustrated by curve-fitting examples, while the second (number of theoretical assumptions) is illustrated by the examples of Newton's Laws and Adler's Theory of the Inferiority Complex.
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Local and Normative Rationality of Science: The 'Content of Discovery' Rehabilitated. [REVIEW]Peter P. Kirschenmann - 1991 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (1):61-72.
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