Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):155-156 (1999)

Daniel Gilman
University of Chicago
A connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness needs to disambiguate its criteria for identifying the relevant vehicles. Moreover, a vehicle theory may appear entirely arbitrary in sorting between what are typically thought of as conscious and unconscious processes.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X99301795
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