Perfectioning trust, reinforcing testimony


Abstract
Miranda Fricker characterizes the most basic or primary form of epistemic, testimonial injustice by way of a set of negative delimitations. In this paper I raise some doubts about how these delimitations are drawn, about the wrongful harms and disadvantages the testimonial injustice is supposed to entail and produce,and about the way Miranda Fricker clarifies the perfectionist character of the corrective virtue on the part of hearers, the ethical and intellectual virtue of testimonial justice.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 0495-4548  
DOI theoria20082318
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