Rationality and salience

Philosophical Studies 57 (1):61-77 (1989)
Abstract
A number of authors, Including Thomas Schelling and David Lewis, have envisaged a model of the generation of action in coordination problems in which salience plays a crucial role. Empirical studies suggest that human subjects are likely to try for the salient combination of actions, a tendency leading to fortunate results. Does rationality dictate that one aim at the salient combination? Some have thought so, Thus proclaiming that salience is all that is needed to resolve coordination problems for agents who are rational in the sense of game theory. I argue against this position; rational agents will not necessarily aim for the salient. It remains to explain how the salient comes to be chosen by human beings. Various possibilities are noted. One involves a mechanism invoked by Hume and Wittgenstein in other contexts: we may project an unreasoned compulsion onto reason, falsely believing that rationality dictates our choice of the salient.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00355662
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References found in this work BETA
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Harvard University Press.
Meaning.Stephen R. Schiffer - 1972 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Languages and Language.David Lewis - 1975 - In Keith Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 3-35.

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Citations of this work BETA
Salience Reasoning.Gerald J. Postema - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):41-55.

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