Topoi (1-2):5-16 (2008)
This article will compare and contrast two very different accounts of convention: the game-theoretical account of Lewis in Convention, and the account initially proposed by Margaret Gilbert (the present author) in chapter six of On Social Facts, and further elaborated here. Gilbert’s account is not a variant of Lewis’s. It was arrived at in part as the result of a detailed critique of Lewis’s account in relation to a central everyday concept of a social convention. An account of convention need not be judged by that standard. Perhaps it reveals the nature of an important phenomenon. Looked at in that light, these very different accounts are not incompatible. Indeed, neither should be ignored if one is seeking to understand the way in which human beings arrive at some degree of social order.
|Keywords||social convention David Lewis social phenomena|
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References found in this work BETA
The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen L. Darwall - 2006 - Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Shared Intention and Personal Intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
Norms and Conventions.Nicholas Southwood & Lina Eriksson - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):195 - 217.
A Convention or (Tacit) Agreement Betwixt Us: On Reliance and its Normative Consequences.Luca Tummolini, Giulia Andrighetto, Cristiano Castelfranchi & Rosaria Conte - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):585-618.
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Lewis, Language, Lust and Lies.Max Kölbel - 1998 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):301 – 315.
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