Strong emergence as a defense of non-reductive physicalism: A physicalist metaphysics for 'downward' determination
Principia 6 (1):89-120 (2002)
AbstractIaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challen,ge to both emergentism cmd ncm-reductIve physicalism lyy providing arguments that these positums are cornmitted to an untenabie combmation of both `upwarcit and 'clouniwardi determmation. In secuon 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realiza:0n relatzon underlies such sicepucal arguments However, tn secuon 2, I suggest that such conclusicrns involve a confusion between the implications of physicahsm and those of a related thesis the Vompleteness of Physics' (Co?) I show tht the truth of Co? poses a very senous obstacle to realized properues beeng efficacrous in a physicalut =verse cmd sikwest that abandonmg Co? offers hope for defending non- reducuve physicalism
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