Authors
Carl Gillett
Northern Illinois University
Abstract
Jaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challenge to both emergentism and nom-reductive physicalism by providing arguments that these positions are committed to an untenable combination of both ‘upward’ and ‘dounward’ determination. In section 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realization relation underlies such skeptical arguments However, in section 2, I suggest that such conclusions involve a confusion between the implications of physicalism and those of a related thesis the ‘Completeness of Physics' I show that the truth of CoP poses a very serious obstacle to realized properties being efficacious in a physicalist universe and suggest that abandoning CoP offers hope for defending non-reductive physicalism. I then formulate a schema for a physicalist metaphysics, in section 3, which rejects CoP. This scenario is one where microphysical properties have a few conditional powers that they contribute to individuals when they realize certain properties In such a situation, I argue, though physicalism holds true there is still plausibly both ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ determination, where the latter is crucially an underappreciated form of determination I temn 'non- causal'. Ultimately, I conclude that this metaphysical schema offers a coherent account of Strongly emergent properties that preserves the truth of NRP albeit, in a form that is purged of any commitment to CoP. Finally, in section: 4, I carefully explore which of Kim's assumptions and arguments this metaphysics undermines.
Keywords Reduction  mental causation  emergence  physicalism  self-organization
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References found in this work BETA

Causality and Properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel. pp. 109-35.
Emergent Properties.Timothy O'Connor - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (2):91-104.
Realization and Mental Causation.Sydney Shoemaker - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 23-33.

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Citations of this work BETA

Science, substance and spatial appearances.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2097-2114.
Synchronic Vs. Diachronic Emergence: A Reappraisal.Olivier Sartenaer - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (1):31-54.
Downward Determination.Charbel Niño El-Hani - 2005 - Abstracta 1 (2):162-192.

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