Shared intention and personal intentions

Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187 (2009)
Abstract
This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman.
Keywords Agreements  Michael Bratman  Directed obligation  Joint commitment  Personal intentions  Plural subjects  Shared intention
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9372-z
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References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
How to Share a Mind: Reconsidering the Group Mind Thesis.Thomas Szanto - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):99-120.
How Does It Feel to Act Together?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):25-46.
Interacting Mindreaders.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863.
Framing Joint Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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How To Share An Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29 - 50.

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