Philosophical Issues 18 (1):143-163 (2008)

Abstract
When making moral judgments, people are typically guided by a plurality of moral rules. These rules owe their existence to human emotions but are not simply equivalent to those emotions. And people’s moral judgments ought to be guided by a plurality of emotion-based rules. The view just stated combines three positions on moral judgment: [1] moral sentimentalism, which holds that sentiments play an essential role in moral judgment,1 [2] descriptive moral pluralism, which holds that commonsense moral judgment is guided by a plurality of moral rules2, and [3] prescriptive moral pluralism, which holds that moral judgment ought to be guided by a plurality of moral rules. In what follows, we will argue for all three positions. We will not present a comprehensive case for these positions nor address many of the arguments philosophers have developed against them. What we will try to show is that recent psychological work supports sentimentalist pluralism in both its descriptive and prescriptive forms
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00142.x
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References found in this work BETA

Principles of Biomedical Ethics.Tom L. Beauchamp - 1979 - Oxford University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 2002 [1785] - Oxford University Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Sentimentalism.Antti Kauppinen - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Value Pluralism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral Judgments and Emotions: A Less Intimate Relationship Than Recently Claimed.Thomas Pölzler - 2015 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 35 (3):177-195.
Deontology Defended.Nora Heinzelmann - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5197–5216.

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