The Nature of Agreements: A Solution to Some Puzzles about Claim-Rights and Joint Intention

In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 215-255 (2014)
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Margaret Gilbert
University of California, Irvine

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