Time travel, coinciding objects, and persistence

In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3. Clarendon Press. pp. 177-198 (2007)
Authors
Cody Gilmore
University of California, Davis
Abstract
Existing puzzles about coinciding objects can be divided into two types, corresponding to the manner in which they bear upon the endurantism v. perdurantism debate. Puzzles of the first type, which involve temporary spatial co-location, can be solved simply by abandoning endurantism in favor of perdurantism, whereas those of the second type, which involve career-long spatial co-location, remain equally puzzling on both views. I show that the possibility of backward time travel would give rise to a new type of puzzle. The new puzzles confront perdurantists and can be solved just by shifting to endurantism
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,941
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Extended Simples.Kris McDaniel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):131 - 141.
The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence.Damiano Costa - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (2):57-75.
Location and Mereology.Cody Gilmore - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Return to the Analogy of Being.Kris McDaniel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688 - 717.
Multilocation and Mereology.Shieva Kleinschmidt - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):253-276.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
227 ( #22,542 of 2,293,874 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #88,229 of 2,293,874 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature