Time travel, coinciding objects, and persistence

In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3. Clarendon Press. pp. 177-198 (2007)
Abstract
Existing puzzles about coinciding objects can be divided into two types, corresponding to the manner in which they bear upon the endurantism v. perdurantism debate. Puzzles of the first type, which involve temporary spatial co-location, can be solved simply by abandoning endurantism in favor of perdurantism, whereas those of the second type, which involve career-long spatial co-location, remain equally puzzling on both views. I show that the possibility of backward time travel would give rise to a new type of puzzle. The new puzzles confront perdurantists and can be solved just by shifting to endurantism
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Extended Simples.Kris McDaniel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):131 - 141.
The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence.Damiano Costa - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (2):57-75.
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A Return to the Analogy of Being.Kris McDaniel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688 - 717.
Multilocation and Mereology.Shieva Kleinschmidt - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):253-276.

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